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1. Introduction
Secret intelligence is the missing dimension in the his-
tory of international relations, as Christopher Andrew
and David Dilks argued (Andrew, 1998; Andrew & Dilks,
1984, p. 1). Since this famous observation, a new gener-
ation of scholars has challenged this neglect, leading to
the emergence of ‘intelligence studies’ as a new field of
historical research. We now know more about the oper-
ational history of intelligence and security services, their
sources and methods, and to a lesser extent, their role
in political decision-making processes. For example, we
know that secret services can be of decisive operational
and political importance, as shown by the significance
of signals intelligence (SIGINT) for the Allied victory of
World War II, the decisive role of Stalin’s spies in copying
Anglo–American plans to build an atomic bomb, and the
repressive and ever-present East German Ministerium
für Staatssicherheit (‘Stasi’) (Childs & Popplewell, 1996;
Lichter, Loeffler, & Siegloch, 2015).
However, we still know little about the social fabric
that binds intelligence communities together. Scholars
of intelligence primarily focus on the (at times spectacu-
lar) operational history of services, putting adventurous
agents and their handlers in the limelight, who seem to
act in a strategic and calculated manner. This focus ne-
glects both a broader selection of intelligence personnel
and the less-adventurous emotions that influence their
actions, which have not been given much thought when
reflecting upon intelligence and its institutions. More
knowledge on a broader variety of internal socio-cultural
factors and dynamics and better insights into structural
characteristics and factors of influence contribute to our
understanding of intelligence communities and similar
organizations that deal with classified information. Relat-
ing to the growing body of literature on emotions in inter-
national relations (Clément & Sangar, 2018, pp. 3-4), this
article contributes to current and future research that
integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on
emotions. I showhow loyalty as an emotionmay become
institutionalized within secret services (Crawford, 2014).
In this article, I argue that secrecy and informal or-
ganization produce, sustain and reinforce feelings of loy-
alty in the socio-cultural structure of intelligence and se-
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curity services. Loyalty is crucial to the level of coop-
eration between intelligence partners, within and be-
tween services. As such, I argue that loyalty, as a build-
ing block of the relationship between individuals, plays
a larger role in the level of internal and external intelli-
gence cooperation than formal work processes which oc-
cur along hierarchical lines. In order to assess the role of
loyalty in intelligence communities, I focus on the Dutch
secret services-in exile in London and their British coun-
terparts during World War II. We know Dutch wartime
intelligence history mainly through the lens of opera-
tional causes célèbres such as the Venlo-incident (1939)
in which the Sicherheitsdienst trapped two SIS officers
and a Dutch officer (e.g., De Jong, 1969), the disastrous
Englandspiel (1942–1943) that drove 40 agents on Dutch
soil right into German hands, eventually killing most of
them (e.g., Foot, 2005a, 2005b; Wolters, 2005), and the
motives of the double agent Christiaan Lindemans, nick-
named ‘King Kong’ (De Graaff, 1997). Lou de Jong’s work
on wartime intelligence (De Jong, 1979) has a broader
strategic-political and socio-cultural focus. For the pur-
poses of this article, de Jong’s work has proven particu-
larly interesting due to the combination of its detailed op-
erational account and its eloquent and detached insights
into the characteristics of the Dutch wartime intelligence
community. Finally, the meticulous, encyclopaedic work
of Kluiters (1993) provides an impressive amount of de-
tailed information on services’ official tasks, organisa-
tion, addresses, dates, and agents.
The case study of the Dutch secret services-in-exile
and their British counterparts is particularly interest-
ing for a number of reasons. First, during World War II
the Dutch intelligence community was forced to collab-
orate not only internally, but also externally with their
British counterparts on whom they depended heavily.
The relatively high, external dependence (or low orga-
nizational autonomy), strong internal dependency rela-
tionships, and the ‘young’ age of the Dutch organizations
involved, make it a case in which it is likely that loyalty
would strongly influence working relationships. At the
same time, the secret nature of the work of intelligence
communities, as further noted below, seems to encour-
age loyalty-based relationships. Even if the wartime se-
cret services-in-exile are an atypical context for 20th and
21st centuries intelligence and security services, the se-
cret environment in which the services functioned make
it to a large extent a typical case study with relatively
broad external validity for contemporary and historical
intelligence organizations.
Second, this case study provides us with unexplored
historical sources giving insights into the specific emo-
tions that shaped the socio-cultural characteristics of the
Dutch intelligence community. A most valuable, detailed
and colourful historical source to partly reconstruct the
socio-cultural atmosphere of the Anglo–Dutch wartime
intelligence community are the reports of the post-World
War II Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the
Policy of theWartime Government-in-Exile. This commis-
sion was set up in 1947 to hold the government-in-exile
retrospectively accountable due to the lack of parliamen-
tary oversight during the war. This commission, initially
aiming to complete its work within one year, worked be-
tween 1947 and 1956 and produced eight large reports
in 20 volumes. These contain the commission’s findings
and, more interesting for the purpose of this article, the
word-for-word testimonies of 850 witnesses. Five out of
these eight volumes relate to the Dutch secret services-
in-exile.
Another valuable source is the ‘London Archive’ of
theMinistries of the Interior and of General Affairs in the
Dutch National Archives. It contains, for example, infor-
mation on Dutch personnel, correspondence between
ministers and heads of Dutch services and their British
opposite numbers, reports on the training of agents
as well as on the division of labour between Dutch
and British services. Also, the NIOD Institute for War,
Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam has a
small number of files on the ‘Bureau Inlichtingen’. Finally,
this research draws onmemoirs of individuals involved in
the Dutch wartime intelligence community.
Below I first conceptualize loyalty in secretive envi-
ronments and then briefly introduce Anglo–Dutch intel-
ligence cooperation during World War II. The empirical
part of the article scrutinizes the two phases (crisis and
recovery) of the Dutch services’ work, the key players,
and their collaboration with their British opposite num-
bers. In conclusion, I assess how secrecy and informal
organization sustain and reinforce feelings of loyalty in
intelligence communities, and I suggest ways to further
integrate research of emotions into intelligence studies.
2. Conceptualizing Loyalty in Secretive Environments
‘Loyalty’ is a special attachment to a state (‘our coun-
try, right or wrong’), an individual or an organisation
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). In the context of this research
‘loyalty’ concerns the attachment to individuals (col-
leagues) and organisations (the Dutch secret services-in
exile and/or their British counterparts). It is related to,
but distinctive from sympathy. While ‘sympathy’ is un-
derstood as a feeling of likeness and recognition towards
another person (Schliesser, 2015), I understand ‘loyalty’
is possible on both the individual and the group level.
‘Loyalty’ presupposes that feelings of sympathy towards
another individual are related to the other’s affiliation
and the connotations that this affiliation evokes. As such,
loyalty can be closely related to individual and collective
interests, and can also be understood from the perspec-
tive of path dependency. In the empirical section of this
article, I analyse first-hand descriptions of interaction
between (groups of) individuals who show strong feel-
ings of (unconditional) likeness and recognition towards
the other.
The secretive environment of intelligence and secu-
rity services is likely to reinforce feelings of loyalty. Loy-
alty becomes part of amutually, beneficial and reciprocal
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relationship in which secrets and loyalty are exchanged
between organizational members (Blau, 1964, p. 30). In
addition, a shared secret can bring great joy, relief and
intimacy with others who share the same secret (Bok,
1989, pp. 36-37). It fosters a strong sense of commu-
nity (Braat, 2012; Gusterson, 1998), so strong that keep-
ing the secret can become more important as a purpose
than any other specific purpose the community officially
has (Bok, 1989, p. 46). Accordingly, secrecy functions as
an organizing principle of social relations: it sets barriers
and presupposes separation, between the secret and the
non-secret, between insiders and outsiders, creating and
reinforcing feelings of loyalty among the secret-keepers
(Horn, 2011, p. 110). Members of the insiders’ commu-
nity, well-organized and tightly knit, may feel superior
vis-à-vis the often unorganized community of outsiders.
In this sense, (the pretence of) secrecy strengthens the
elitist nature and the social exclusiveness of the group of
insiders and raises the walls between insiders and out-
siders (Simmel, 1906, pp. 486–487, 489).
Feelings of loyalty within the insiders’ community are
further strengthened because secrecy may function as a
means to wield power. Being part of a secretive commu-
nity is a means to increase one’s influence and to main-
tain and strengthen the status quo. Accordingly, the use
of secrecy by governmental bureaucracies extends far
beyond the functionally motivated secret (Weber, 2013,
pp. 992–993, 1271), and may have a self-reinforcing ef-
fect: the socio-cultural and political benefits of secrecy
incite more secrecy.
3. Disentangling the Anglo–Dutch Intelligence
Community during World War II
No other policy area of the Dutch wartime government-
in-exile, the Parliamentary Commission stated, required
so many hearings as the area of military and civil intel-
ligence. This was ‘an extraordinarily elaborate and com-
plex’ subject. ‘The number of questionswas so abundant
and problems appeared to be so intensely interwoven,
that two years were needed to manage this information
and to process it in such a way that could result in a
good overview of the matter’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950,
vol. 4AB, p. 2). Even Minister of War Van Lidth de Jeude,
responsible for the Dutch subversive services between
1942 and 1945, had clearly lost track, and complained in
June 1942 that ‘there are now somany commissions [sic]
that overlap and obstruct each others’ work that I am
getting mind-boggled’ (Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 727). In-
deed, therewas a large number of Dutch intelligence and
subversive services which succeeded each other, worked
in parallel, and completed or overlapped each other’s
work, as Figure 1 clarifies.
Secret services-in-exile were essential in order to
know what was going on in occupied Holland. Queen
Wilhelmina even considered the services the most im-
portant of all government institutions-in-exile (accord-
ing to van ’t Sant, as cited in De Jong, 1979, pp. 843,
973). They gathered military and political intelligence
through the Centrale Inlichtingendienst (CID) and the
Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), and they committed subversive
acts through the Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (BVT),
BureauMilitaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (MVT) and the
Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO). The Allied forces,
including the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), pri-
oritized military intelligence, aimed at collecting data
on the number of German forces in The Netherlands,
and the location of their headquarters and military stock
points. Political intelligence, aimed at grasping public
opinion and the needs of the resistance movement in
occupied Holland, was of mostly Dutch interest. There-
fore, it remained a secondarymatter throughout thewar,
sometimes to considerable frustration of the Dutch intel-
ligence community. Sabotage, finally, was of British and
later Allied interest and was intended to harm the Ger-
man presence in occupiedDutch territory. It was the field
of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the
Dutch subversive services.
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the Dutch secret services-in-exile by years in function, May 1940–May 1945 (Kluiters,
1993). Abbreviations: CID: Centrale Inlichtingendienst (Central Intelligence Service); BI: Bureau Inlichtingen (Bureau Intelli-
gence); BVT: Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MVT: Bureau
Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Military Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MID: Militaire
Inlichtingendienst (Military Intelligence Service); BBO: Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (Bureau for Special Assignments).
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The Dutch gatheredmilitary and political intelligence
and committed sabotage through nine services and sev-
eral separate intelligence channels.1 Each service collab-
orated either with the Dutch section of SIS under W.J.
Hooper (until December 1940), then C.E.C. Rabagliati
(until June 1942) and finally C.O. Seymour, or with the
Dutch section of SOE under R.V. Laming (until autumn
1941), Ch.C. Blizard (until August 1942), S. Bingham (un-
til November 1943), and finally R.I. Dobson. Seymour,
Laming, Blizard and Bingham all spoke fluently Dutch.
4. The Years of Crisis
On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded The Netherlands.
Three days later Queen Wilhelmina escaped to London
and the Dutch government followed her soon after. On
her journey to London, the Queen was accompanied by
François van ‘t Sant, a former chief superintendent of
police in The Hague and former liaison officer of GS III,
the Dutch security service before World War II. An enig-
matic and stern man both respected, feared and hated,
he had become the subject of numerous rumours (Van
der Zee, 2015). Nevertheless, van ‘t Sant had become
QueenWilhelmina’s confidant, a position he had earned
by preventing scandals due to theQueen’s unfaithful hus-
band Prince Hendrik (De Jong, 1979, pp. 844–859; Ver-
burg, 2001, pp. 274, 378–388). Upon arrival in London,
he became head of the first secret service-in-exile.2 And
although he would not remain in this position for long,
his presence in London would leave a strongmark on the
functioning of the subsequent Dutch secret services and
their collaboration with their British opposite numbers.
In many ways Francois van ‘t Sant―with his secretive na-
ture, the personal and exclusive character of his connec-
tions, and the strong feelings of loyalty and animosity he
aroused―exemplified some important characteristics of
Dutch intelligence during the war.
During the wartime years, the Dutch secret services
experienced a long period of institutional and opera-
tional crisis (1940–1942/1943) followed by a period of
recovery (1943/1944–1945). The years of crisis, between
July 1940 and November 1942, were characterized by
feelings of both loyalty and rivalry. Several services suc-
ceeded each other rapidly and there was hardly any op-
erational continuity or success.
Francois van ‘t Sant headed the first intelligence ser-
vice CID, founded on 19 July 1940.3 He was strongly sup-
ported by Queen Wilhelmina and, more importantly, he
was the only Dutchmanwith whomMenzies, head of SIS,
wanted to collaborate and whom he trusted (De Jong,
1979, p. 861). Van ‘t Sant was a familiar face to SIS; dur-
ing and afterWorldWar I he had successfully established
and maintained connections between GS III and SIS (De
Jong 1979, p. 845). Indeed, van ‘t Sant had proven to be
a keen assistant to his British opposite numbers, even
though he had strong British opponents too. For exam-
ple, Laming, the first head of SOE Dutch section, was
convinced van ‘t Sant was unreliable, he refused to work
with him, and made it a personal quest to convince oth-
ers of his suspicions against van ‘t Sant. Finally, possibly
because of his quest against van ‘t Sant, he was trans-
ferred to another position (De Jong, 1979, pp. 836–837).
In Dutch governmental and resistance circles van ‘t Sant
also suffered from a rather negative reputation. He was
considered a traitor and a ‘sinister figure’ (De Jong, 1979,
p. 972; Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4AB, p. 32). A later
head of a Dutch subversive service, van Oorschot, de-
clared that ‘van ‘t Sant meddled with everything. He
was a dictator.…We escaped Hitler and his likes and
we got van ‘t Sant instead’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950,
vol. 4C1, p. 342).
Van ‘t Sant’s CID was based in 77 Chester Square
and had four members as of August 1940. It had to
establish connections with occupied Holland and coor-
dinate intelligence activities from the departments of
Justice, War, and Home Affairs. Van ‘t Sant collaborated
harmoniously with Hooper, head of SIS Dutch section.
He collaborated even more harmoniously with Hooper’s
successor, Euan Rabagliati, ‘a lean, impeccably dressed
short Englishman’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 130).
Van ‘t Sant and Rabagliati intensified their collabora-
tion when Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions,
Chris Krediet and Peter Tazelaar, offered to work for
them. The ‘Hazelhoff Roelfzemagroup’ becamenoted for
establishing a risky transportation service between the
Dutch and English coasts. Of all drop-offs at the Dutch
coast, the most innovative drop off was the one from
Tazelaar at Scheveningen, near The Hague, in November
1941. As a convincing guest of the pro-German dancing
party in Scheveningen, Tazelaar defied the wave break-
ers and arrived at the beach in a ‘waterproof cocoon’
within which he was dressed in a dinner jacket, sprinkled
with a substantial amount of rum (Hazelhoff Roelfzema,
2005, p. 546).
Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered he was serving the
Dutch Queen directly, rather than any Dutch bureau-
cratic intelligence organisation. Not surprisingly, he enti-
tled his memoirs ‘Soldier of Orange’ in which the Queen
figured as a distant mother.4 Van ‘t Sant had provided
Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions with an office
and apartment behind 77 Chester Square, where van
‘t Sant himself, Queen Wilhelmina and Prince Bernhard
had their offices. The choice of this location indicates
a degree of likeness and appreciation between the
Queen, Van ‘t Sant and Hazelhoff Roelfzema. Hazelhoff
Roelfzema and his companions lived in a coach house,
next to the Queen’s garage and with a view on van ‘t
Sant’s office. Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered the ‘Mews’,
1 I specifically exclude the Bureau voor Bijzondere Aangelegenheden, which functioned between 8 February 1941 until mid-June 1941 and came under
the Ministry of War. Its work and influence seem negligible (Kluiters, 1993, pp. 102–103).
2 With the general term ‘secret service’ I refer to all Dutch security, intelligence and subversive services. I specify when needed.
3 All addresses, dates of foundation and liquidation of services are from Kluiters (1993).
4 The Dutch Queen is a member of the House of Orange-Nassau.
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as he called it, ‘his base and all official Dutch services
outside theMews as hostile’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005,
p. 122). Even if Hazelhoff Roelfzema did as he pleased,
lacked modesty and was difficult to keep in check, he
made a good match with van ‘t Sant and Rabagliati,
who he affectionately nicknamed ‘the Rabbi’ (Hazelhoff
Roelfzema, 2005, p. 132). Their collaboration was to out-
last van ‘t Sant’s brief period as official head of service:
The reason why we got to van ‘t Sant’, Hazelfhoff
Roelfzema explained later, ‘was that he was the
only man in the whole of London who could get
things done when you needed something. Every
time I needed backing and special things, I went to
van ‘t Sant. All Dutchmen who escaped the Nether-
lands and arrived in London in 1940-1941 to join
the Allied forces…eventually all ended up with van
‘t Sant. They all knew that under his guidance some-
thing happened at least. We needed someone impor-
tant who supported us. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005,
pp. 544–545)
On van ‘t Sant’s position in relation to SIS Dutch
section and the Hazelhoff Roelfzema-group, Hazelhoff
Roelfzema wrote in his memoirs that:
From the moment the Rabbi…entered the scene, the
Mews were fully on steam. We collaborated directly
with SIS where nothing seemed impossible. Neverthe-
less, van ‘t Sant mysteriously remained the centre of
the enterprise.…It seemed as if we were involved in
an important family project of which General van ‘t
Sant, modest, silent, in the background, nevertheless
firmly retained the lead. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005,
pp. 132–133)
Van ‘t Sant had a diplomatic approach to his British op-
posite numbers. This amounted to an efficient way of ac-
quiring his say in controlling contacts with the Nether-
lands without, however, explicitly demanding more in-
fluence. According to himself, this was due to his basic
assumption that:
Weworked jointly for the greater goal, and the English
were in the lead in England. Sowe provided assistance
to the English through our local knowledge of Dutch
contacts and circumstances and we gave our most
able fellow compatriots to contribute to this goal. But
the highest leadership has always been with the En-
glish; they were, after all, the experts on intelligence
services in their country. (Enquêtecommissie, 1950,
vol. 4C1, p. 486)
Even if SIS preferred military intelligence, van ‘t Sant
made sure to ‘satisfy…those who wanted to know some-
thing positively’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1,
p. 483). By this he meant Queen Wilhelmina and sev-
eral ministers. They were accustomed to turn to van ‘t
Sant every time they required non-military information,
for example about an individual’s political inclination
or reliability.
Accordingly, van ‘t Sant had surrounded himself with
a number of influential actors in the intelligence commu-
nity, who appreciated the combination of van ‘t Sant’s
servitude toward the British services and his skills in
obtaining operational means. These loyal individuals
were his British opposite numbers, Hazelhoff Roelfzema
and his companions, Prime Minister Gerbrandy, Queen
Wilhelmina and her son-in-law Prince Bernhard.
By the summer of 1941 van ‘t Sant’s position as
head of the service became difficult as he was plagued
by persisting rumours, in the Netherlands and London,
that he was responsible for arrests by the Sicherheitsdi-
enst in the Netherlands, and the rumours continued un-
til the end of his life (De Jong, 1979, pp. 863–870). On
14 August 1941, R.P.J. Derksema succeeded him in the
second CID, which had about ten members. Derksema,
a former lawyer, lacked management skills and had lit-
tle sense of security. He was, according to Hazelhoff
Roelfzema, ‘a charming, friendlyman, way too decent for
the tough world of secret services’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema,
2005, p. 128). Under his leadership, he did not manage
to send out even one agent (De Jong 1979, pp. 888–889).
Rabagliati refused to work with him and objected that
‘nothing ever happens there. There are never any results.
They cannot be galvanised into action’ (Enquêtecom-
missie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 543). Hazelhoff Roelfzema com-
plained that ‘fromDerksema I didn’t get the slightest sup-
port. Every time I wanted to talk to him, he was on leave’
(Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 542). ‘While we
were all possessed with that sense of urgency.…The less
business we had to do with them [from the CID], the
better we worked’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1,
p. 544). Prime Minister Gerbrandy, however, did not
seem to care much for the weak guidance of the CID
because he knew that van ‘t Sant continued to collab-
orate with Rabagliati and Hazelhoff Roelfzema behind
the scenes and outside the realm of the CID. Not only
did Gerbrandy know about this rather singular construc-
tion, he supported it (De Jong, 1979, p. 833). Correctly,
Rabagliati described van ‘t Sant’s dismissal as head of the
service as ‘kicking him out through the front door and
letting him back in again through the back door’ (Van
Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 515–516). And not surprisingly,
relations between Derksema and Rabagliati were bad,
and collaboration between the CID and SIS Dutch section
was negligible.
Besides these personal rivalries and the loyal bonds
between the trinity Hazelhoff Roelfzema-van ‘t Sant-
Rabagliati that by-passed Derksema, there were other
reasons for the poor relations between the CID and SIS
Dutch section. Derksema had a radically different ap-
proach to working with Rabagliati and obtaining the con-
trol hewished to have on operational matters. In the first
meeting he had with ‘the English’ he ‘explicitly required
that [he] have a bigger say in the future deployment of
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agents than the Dutch institutions had had until then.
[He] wanted to be completely informed of the aim of the
missions, the preparations etc’. What Derksema proba-
bly did not realisewell enoughwas that van ‘t Sants diplo-
matic approach had, unofficially and implicitly, provided
him with substantial knowledge and influence on opera-
tional matters. Derksema further hardened his position,
and between August 1941 and the beginning of 1942,
he refused to provide new agents for deployment to
SIS (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C2, pp. 1110–1111).
Rabagliati, in turn, found it ‘impossible to work with the
man’ (van ’t Sant, as cited in Enquêtecommissie, 1950,
vol. 4C2, p. 1565)
With Colonel M.R. de Bruyne, Derksema’s successor,
relations with SIS Dutch section deteriorated even fur-
ther and reached an all-time low in the spring of 1942. De
Bruyne assumed office on 5 February 1942 and resigned
on 31 May 1942; frustrated, disillusioned, and tired of
intelligence work. His character was surely a significant
contributory factor as were the loyal bonds between
Hazelhoff Roelfzema, van ‘t Sant, and Rabagliati who con-
tinued working behind his back, irritating him severely.
De Bruyne was ‘fully reliable and straightforward’, as
Minister of War Van Lidth de Jeude (September 1942–
February 1945) described him. ‘A fair soldier’, he con-
tinued, ‘but politically completely unskilled, who has be-
come the victim of those who are more experienced
in the profession’ (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 692,
712, 812, 973–974). ‘Completely honest’, according to
Hazelhoff Roelfzema, ‘he didn’t appear to me as the typ-
ical intelligence guy’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1,
p. 550). De Bruyne preferred to stick to his own concepts
and ideas, hewas proud, with little fantasy and little flexi-
bility, and he liked to see hierarchical relations respected
(De Jong, 1979, p. 900). He was also anxious not to be by-
passed.5 De Bruyne, like Derksema, decisively launched
himself into a power struggle to acquire more control of
contacts with occupied Holland. His personality, keen on
clear agreements, openness and hierarchy, was not able
to solve the matter in a diplomatic way.
The ‘small clique’ of Hazelhoff Roelfzema (Van Lidth
de Jeude, 2001, p. 692), which officially worked under
de Bruyne’s supervision but in practice ignored him com-
pletely, was another source of irritation to de Bruyne.
Hazelhoff Roelfzema’s powerful supporters also annoyed
him, van ‘t Sant in particular (Enquêtecommissie, 1950,
vol. 4C1, p. 450).
Every time I went to Chester Square, I noticed
Rabagliati was talking to van ‘t Sant. I did not know
anything about the finer points of the Hazelhoff
Roelfzema-case. So I said to Rabagliati: what are
you doing here? He would say: these are matters
that are none of your business.…So I stopped shar-
ing information with van ‘t Sant, but Rabagliati was
informed on everything and he used to tell every-
thing to van ‘t Sant. The effect was therefore zero.
(Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 453)
De Bruyne and Rabagliati were in violent dispute, and in
the subsequent months, the situation exacerbated even
further, with Hazelhoff Roelfzema’s and van ‘t Sant’s loy-
alty to Rabagliati being the principal source of unrest
within the Anglo–Dutch intelligence community. As a re-
sult, de Bruyne resigned in May 1942 and Minister Van
Lidth de Jeude noted in his diary that: ‘the “clique” had
won the battle again’ (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 704).
While de Bruyne led the CID and maintained his em-
bittered relations with Rabagliati, he also led the subver-
sive services BVT and MVT: the Dutch opposite numbers
of SOE. De Bruyne’s relationswith SOE concerned primar-
ily Blizard and Bingham, heads of SOE’s Dutch Section,
Hambro, deputy head of SOE, and Gubbins, head of op-
erations at SOE.
In the course of 1942, SOE approacheddeBruynewith
the purpose to arrive at some degree of collaboration in
sending out agents to the Netherlands for sabotage activ-
ities. In April 1942 this resulted in the ‘Plan for Holland’,
and in June 1942 the first agents were sent out and BVT
and SOE started collaborating on a more structural basis.
However, the realisation of the ‘Plan for Holland’ had to
first overcome the obstacle of de Bruyne’s insistence that
he acquire more control over operational matters.
From the summer of 1942, de Bruyne, worn out by
his power struggle with Rabagliati, began distancing him-
self from intelligence and subversive matters. And in
November 1943 the first disconcerting signs of the tragic
Englandspiel were noticed: the German Abwehr had cap-
tured Dutch agents who had been dropped by SOE into
the Netherlands and repeatedly fooled SOE into send-
ing more agents, eventually resulting in 54 deaths.6 As
a result, De Bruyne was no longer allowed to collabo-
rate with SOE and in February 1944, when the full extent
of the Englandspiel was discovered, de Bruyne resigned.
The MVT, including the MID, ceased to exist.
5. Sudden Recovery
The years of crisis ended around 1943/1944 with the
Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), the Dutch intelligence service,
5 De Bruyne’s fear to be bypassed is shown in his following correspondence: Neave to de Bruyne, 29 November 1942 in: National Archives, Nr. toegang:
2.13.71,Ministerie van Defensie te Londen; Ministerie van Oorlog te Londen en afwikkeling daarvan, Bestanddeel: 2166, Correspondentie met kapitein
A.M.S. Neave inzake de samenwerking met de Engelse inlichtingendienst, de Bruyne to Van Lidth de Jeude, 21 April 1943, de Bruyne to Van Lidth de
Jeude and Somer, 2 November 1943, and de Bruyne to Van Lidth de Jeude and Gerbrandy, 10 July 1944 in: National Archives, Nr. toegang: 2.13.71,Min-
isterie van Defensie te Londen; Ministerie van Oorlog te Londen en afwikkeling daarvan, Bestanddeel: 2394, Correspondentie met het bureau Militaire
Voorbereiding Terugkeer van het ministerie van Oorlog.
6 The Englandspiel has attracted scholarly and more speculative attention. The idea that the Englandspiel agents were deceived by SOE instead of the
Abwehr is widespread, especially in the Netherlands (for example, seeWolters 2005). Themost convincing and elaborative accounts of the Englandspiel
remains de Jong (1979) and Foot (2005a). Wolters and Foot disagreed sharply concerning the Englandspiel (see Foot, 2005b, pp. 241–243).
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and the Bureau voor Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO), the
Dutch subversive service, as new actors within the Dutch
intelligence community. This was ‘the last chance’ to
organize a new Dutch subversive service and to find a
means to collaborate efficiently, as Lord Selborne, then
minister of Economic Warfare and responsible for SOE
said to Gerbrandy. With BI and BBO, the Dutch ser-
vices finally acquired a larger say in agents’ training, as-
signments, and communications; Anglo–Dutch collabo-
ration became more efficient, fairly equal, and compe-
tition softened considerably. Strikingly, the change had
been sudden rather than gradual. Undoubtedly, the dis-
covery of the Englandspiel contributed to this turning
point. And possibly, the years of rivalries, incompetence
and inefficiency prompted fatigue and the willingness to
change among several actors within and outside the in-
telligence community.
BI’s existence was steady, its personnel diligent, and
its collaborationwith the British efficient especiallywhen
compared to the years of crisis. Its most influential head
of service was J.M. Somer, a major in the Dutch East
Indies Army and former staff member of GS III. Un-
der Somer, BI played a leading role in the Dutch intelli-
gence community until the end of the war. Even if quick-
tempered, keen on a fight, provocative in his extramarital
contacts and his authoritarian views, (De Jong, 1979, pp.
949–953) Somer was the right person to head BI. Under
his guidance, BI managed to collaborate with SIS on an
almost equal footing, in the fields of agents’ recruitment,
training, and assignments. (De Jong 1979, pp. 957–958)
Simultaneously, Hazelhoff Roelfzema disappeared from
the centre of attention and as the principal source of un-
rest within the Dutch intelligence community.
On the subversive side, BBO armed and trained the
Dutch Forces of the Interior that were created in Septem-
ber 1944 to coordinate the Dutch resistance, and it col-
laborated with SIS and SOE (De Jong, 1979, p. 960). Af-
ter the discovery of the Englandspiel BBO was a fresh
start with initially no office and no personnel. Head of
service Major-General J.W. van Oorschot, former head
of GS III, staffed BBO together with two colleagues. All
three agreed that ‘we need to change, collaborationwith
the English should becomemuch heartier’ (Enquêtecom-
missie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 344; De Jong, 1979, pp. 964,
967–968). And indeed, Anglo–Dutch collaboration be-
came ‘very pleasant’, and Dobson, head of SOE Dutch
section, was ‘a very suitable man to work with’, Van
Oorschot explained (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1,
pp. 344–346). Even if SOE Dutch section was responsible
for technical matters, BBO and SOE Dutch section collab-
orated on an almost equal footing.
Van Oorschot was not easily offended, a calm and
modest person, conscious of what he knew and what he
did not. And importantly, one of his key concerns was to
avoid fights:
If secret services fight, they won’t get much work
done. That’s the biggest disaster there is. I always
told [my colleagues De Graaf and Klijzing]: what-
ever you do,…never get into a fight.…Because you’ll
start competing with each other and you’ll keep
things concealed from each other and you’ll get noth-
ing but trouble.’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1,
pp. 345–346)
6. Conclusions
Nobody within the Dutch intelligence community made
better use of secrecy as a means to foster loyalty and
wield power than van ‘t Sant. It suited his personality
and it camenaturally to him.Henever properly explained
his actions and hardly left any written accounts of his in-
volvement in intelligence matters: no agreements on his
collaboration with Rabagliati, no diary, and no memoirs.
Together with Eric Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Euan Rabagliati,
and Queen Wilhelmina, he was in his native element in
informal organisational forms.
Loyalty was a major determinant in the level of col-
laboration within the Dutch intelligence community and
between the Dutch and British intelligence communi-
ties. This case study suggests the existence of an inverse
correlation between a strong emphasis on personal loy-
alty and informal relations in intelligence relationships,
on the one hand, and a certain level of professional-
ism and organisational stability on the other. As such,
it argues that loyalty has two interrelated force multi-
pliers: secrecy and informal organisation. First, shared
secrets sustained and reinforced the loyal bonds be-
tween Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Van ‘t Sant, Rabagliati, and
Queen Wilhelmina. These bonds of loyalty disregarded
and thwarted formal work processes along bureaucratic
and hierarchical lines. The Hazelhoff Roelfzema group
was spectacular in terms of the social and institutional
turmoil it caused within the Dutch intelligence commu-
nity and its counterproductive effect on formal intelli-
gence collaboration. Derksema and de Bruyne―as out-
siders―underestimated the strong ties, fostered by se-
crecy, among members of this group. Naively, they ex-
pected to be included in the circle of insiders by forceful
demands or by official agreement.
Second, informal organisation strengthened loyalty
as a basis for efficient collaboration. During the years of
crisis, the Dutch services functioned informally, allowing
ample leeway for the ‘clique’ of van ‘t Sant to carry out
business as usual, based on feelings of loyalty. Only af-
ter the discovery of the Englandspiel Anglo–Dutch intel-
ligence collaboration was formalized (instead of person-
alized) and its efficiency improved. As the prominent sig-
nificance of loyalty receded to the background, Anglo–
Dutch collaboration finally professionalized.
Intelligence and security services are an inherent
part of international relations. Arguments in favour of
research on emotions in the field of international rela-
tions, as put forward by for example Bleiker and Hutchi-
son (2018), also apply to intelligence studies. Moreover,
the secretive environment of intelligence is likely to mag-
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nify certain emotions and increase their significance in
intelligence communities, such as trust, distrust, and
fear. Research on emotions in intelligence communities
could add to our knowledge on, for example, the moti-
vations of intelligence officers and agents, the psycho-
logical benefits and costs of operational work, and com-
munity feeling. Also, the great importance of emotions
in the relationship between a case officer and his agent
can hardly be overstated, even though systematic anal-
ysis of this topic is scarce in intelligence literature. Re-
search on these topics would require the use of (histor-
ical) sources such as interviews, memoirs, and personal
files. By adding emotions to the dominant operational
focus of intelligence studies we can further deepen our
understanding of intelligence communities and, as such,
contribute to a further professionalization of the field of
intelligence studies.
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